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This paper looks at the argument of one of the proponents of the Objective 
List Theory of Well-being, Thomas Hurka, in his book The Best Things in Life, 
and contrasts it with Plato’s arguments from several of his dialogues; in 
particular the Philebus. Hurka makes two claims: that there isn’t one ultimate 
good (as he says Socrates, Plato and Aristotle supposed); and there isn’t a 
single best human life that’s right for all human beings. I will show that there 
is much agreement between Hurka and Plato, but that Hurka’s account of 
Plato’s argument that virtue (being rational) is necessary and sufficient for the 
good life, obscures Plato’s contribution to the continuing arguments in this 
area.  
 
 
In the Odyssey, Odysseus upon trying to find his way home encounters the 
island of the lotus eaters, a community of people who eat a sweet fruit and 
become pleasantly intoxicated, forgetting all their worries, responsibilities, 
and anything beyond their immediate concerns. At least some of Odysseus’ 
men wish to stay and join them. And he is forced to drag them back to the 
ship and lock them up, before sailing away. Some philosophers have 
defended the lotus eaters’ way of life, by arguing that pleasure is the most 
valuable component of a good life. In Plato’s day there was Aristippus and 
the Cyrenaics, amongst others (Usher, 2017:44–46). Amongst the modern 
philosophers, there is Bentham — and to some extent Mill. There are also 
philosophers making the case for hedonism today (e.g. Feldman, 2004). 
In opposition are Socrates and Plato, who are typically presented as 
arguing for wisdom, variously unpacked as reason and knowledge, (and 
which Socrates and Plato said must be synonymous with virtue), as 
necessary and sufficient for the good life. Additionally, there are 
philosophers who argue that there isn’t one ultimate good that is necessary 
and sufficient for the good-life, nor a single good life that is fit for everyone  
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but instead argue for what is known as the objective list theory of well-being 
(or happiness).1 On list theories, pleasure and reason are on the list, along 
with other goods like living justly, achieving worthy goals, gaining 
knowledge etc., and the good life is the one that contains at least some degree 
of each of the goods on the list. Such an argument is well put in Thomas 
Hurka’s, The Best Things in Life (Hurka, 2011). 
Plato has several interlocutors in different dialogues defending the 
primacy of pleasure against reason in the good life. In the Philebus, a later 
dialogue on the topic of pleasure, Socrates’ interlocutor, Protarchus, takes 
the position that pleasure is essential for happiness as it is good by nature 
and it is what makes a person happy (Phil 11b–c). Under Socrates’ 
questioning Protarchus agrees that the temperate take pleasure in their self-
control and the intemperate take pleasure in their lack of it. But he insists, 
against Socrates’ provocations, that this makes no difference to the pleasure 
itself. Protarchus is adamant that while the occasions or causes of pleasure 
can be so unlike each other that they can be considered opposed, the 
pleasure itself, cannot be “un-alike”, or opposed, (Phil 12c–13c). 
Protarchus’ view that pleasure is distinct from what occasions it is 
common amongst hedonists, and with it a view on the nature of pleasures 
(and pains) that understands them as sensations or feelings (relatively 
simple psychological or qualitative states). These mental states can be 
generated from very different activities, but it is central to the hedonist thesis 
that the pleasure and pain so generated is the same sort of thing in each case, 
the only significant differences being what causes or occasions them, and 
their size and duration (Usher, 2017:41–46). Hence pleasure units derived 
from an activity or occasion are the same value whether the occasion or 
activity really happened or was an illusion, and the pleasure units a 
compassionate person gets in exercising compassion are of the same 
currency as the pleasure units a sadistic person gets in inflicting pain. 
Hedonists are committed to this position because the sameness of all 
pleasures (and all pains), however they are generated, allows them to be 
measured and compared, and to be used as units in a simple method for 
living the good life. Following the hedonic calculus (HC) one pursues 
activities and occasions with an eye to maximising the amount in terms of   
                                                          
1 Objective list theories of well-being/happiness hold that there is a plurality of goods that 
benefit people and does not identify an underlying feature shared by these goods, and these 
goods can benefit people even if they don’t care for them or dislike them(Arneson, 
1999:113–142). 
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size and duration of pleasure units, while minimising pain units (Feldman, 
2004:25–26). 
Two counter arguments are as follows. Firstly, pleasures and pains can 
be complex and can be differentiated, such that they cannot be reduced to 
just a number based upon their size and duration but have deeper attributes 
upon which we can judge their value. Some of them, Plato will argue are 
“counterfeit coins” as it were, and have dimensions or qualities that are 
harmful, even while remaining pleasant. Or are beneficial, even while 
remaining painful in the case of pains. Consequently, the HC will fail or will 
need adjustment to mitigate against these shortfalls.2 Hurka has some 
different arguments to Plato, but he nevertheless is sympathetic to the idea 
that some pleasures are improved by fitting in with other goods necessary 
for the good life, including not being delusional, or not being vicious 
pleasures taken in inflicting suffering on others (Hurka, 2011:4, 7, 24–26, 50–
70). A second counter argument is that there are other intrinsic goods, such 
as knowledge, achievement, and being morally good, each of which is as 
important (or even more important) than pleasure to the goodness of the 
good life (Hurka, 2011:72). These counter arguments aim to establish that 
pleasure is a conditional good and that therefore it cannot be sufficient for 
the goodness of the good life.  
The first counter argument aims to ruin the HC by preventing the 
hedonists from insulating the goodness of pleasure from that which 
occasions it and reducing the complexity of pleasures and pains down to 
simple units. In the Philebus, Plato has Socrates argue that pleasures (and 
pains) can, contra Protarchus, be importantly different in their nature and 
place in a human life, such that we must rule some out. He has Socrates point 
to the sometimes disruptive and destructive relationship between some 
pleasures and pains that is not present in other unmixed pleasures, and also 
argues to the initial bafflement of Protarchus that there are pleasures and 
pains that are false in several senses, and these are opposed to true pleasures 
and pains (Phil 12c–13c, 40e–51a). Underlying the argument for false 
pleasures and pains, Plato gives a sophisticated account of pleasures and 
pains as propositional attitudes/representational states, which opens 
pleasures up to discrimination in the same way that we would discriminate 
between the virtues and vices of character, and between true and false beliefs 
(Phil 38c–40e).  
                                                          
2 There remain defenders of hedonism, with better arguments (Feldman, 2004). 
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Are pleasures (and pains) capable of being dissimilar and opposed, false 
and vicious in a way that renders the HC defective? One response to this 
question considered by Hurka amongst others is Aristotle’s but an argument 
is also found in Mill, who did think that some kinds of pleasurable 
phenomena were more valuable than others (Mill, 1957:12). However, after 
consideration of several arguments Hurka isn’t convinced to abandon what 
he calls the “simple view”, that diverse types of pleasure are all equally 
good, differing in value only by intensity and duration (Hurka, 2011:25). He 
distinguishes different types of pleasure, from simple pleasures like 
sensations in your consciousness of the sort typically described as bodily 
pleasures, from pleasures that are propositional attitudes, and from pleasant 
moods (Hurka, 2011:16–21). The pleasures and pains understood as 
sensations he takes, like the hedonists, to be produced by activities, which 
they are distinct from, such that the pleasure (or pain) may have been 
produced by other different activities. The pleasures that are propositional 
attitudes he takes to be mental representations with a particular object, such 
as that your preferred sporting team won the grand final, that you are 
walking along the beach, or that you performed well at a concert, (or in the 
case of pain, suffering that you are stuck in gridlock, or are lost, or have 
failed at an important task). In the case of both pleasures and pains of this 
latter sort, their essence is in how you take things, the importance of your 
team winning, the surroundings, that you are doing well etc., or the opposite 
in the case of pain. And as such Hurka recognises that the propositional 
attitude type of pleasures (and pains) can have very extended objects, 
including for example your “whole life”, or “life on Earth,” etc. (Hurka, 
2011:20–21). 
After making these distinctions Hurka argues that all kinds of pleasures 
can be desirable and isn’t convinced by arguments that they differ in value 
(Hurka, 2011:21–29). However, he later seems sympathetic to the idea that 
some are worth seeking more than others, and that some might be bad, and 
gives a number of arguments, many of which can be found in the Philebus. 
Like Plato, Hurka points to the relationship between some kinds of pleasures 
and pains; that you can’t have the pleasure (the good thing) without 
incurring greater bad things, (pain, the loss of reputation, or livelihood etc). 
He raises the problem of the paradox of pleasure, in that the harder you try 
for it, the more elusive it gets. He also discusses the problems with false 
pleasures (of the sort one would have on the Experience Machine, see  
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below), mindless pleasures, and the badness of sadistic pleasures, and the 
good of compassionate pains (Hurka, 2011:33–44, 63–72).3 
Although Hurka’s analysis doesn’t go much into Plato’s admittedly 
difficult argument for false pleasures as given in the Philebus, he is in 
agreement that simple bodily pleasures and the pleasures of the sort the 
lotus eaters enjoy, often so localised and episodic (as these kinds of feelings 
often are), do not seem to be the sort of thing that a person could construct 
a whole good life out of (Hurka, 2011:24).4 So although he is not convinced 
that there are better or worse pleasures in terms of their pleasantness, his 
examples suggest that there is, on balance, something better about pleasures 
that aren’t built upon false beliefs, and are not morally vicious, and which 
fit in with an extended and flourishing human life (Hurka, 2011:72). 
On this point, Plato has a richer account of the differences between 
pleasures that he uses to argue that some pleasures (and pains) are so 
different that they really are opposites. Recall the claim that some pleasures, 
such as walking along the beach, performing in a concert etc., are not, in 
essence, feelings occasioned by an object but rather intentional states or 
propositional attitudes by which we attach a certain significance to its object. 
Plato argues that it is pleasures (and pains) of this kind, in which the true 
nature of pleasure (and pain) is revealed (Phil 32c–d.). He has Socrates argue 
that desire is a pain that is about a disruption in our constitution (broadly 
understood to include the condition of the embodied psyche) and directs the 
agent towards the object that would restore it (Phil 34d–35d).5 And so, both 
pain and pleasure are concern laden, since they are suffering or rejoicing at 
some state of affairs the agent takes to be deleterious, or restorative for the 
agent.6 The argument of the Philebus is that pleasure in the human being is 
essentially a cognitive phenomenon and is representational (Usher, 2012:83–
139).7 
Plato develops this idea by exploring several ways in which pleasure can 
be false or mistakenly represent or regard things (Phil 36c–51a). Those   
                                                          
3 Hurka isn’t quite right in his cursory account of false pleasures, (Hurka, 2011:32–33). A good 
analysis of Plato’s false pleasures can be found in (Frede, 1985) and (Couvalis & Usher, 
2003). On the concept of false pleasure more generally see (Thalberg, 1962). 
4 Furthermore, Hurka argues that even amongst feelings we value other feelings or lack of them 
in the case of pain, more highly than pleasure, (Hurka, 2011:54, Chapter 3). 
5 Plato’s claim is that even a relatively simple desire such as thirst is not just a brute feeling, but 
a specific type of pain experienced only by an agent who knows what the desire is for. 
6 See Frede, 1992, 1985. 
7 See also Evans, 2007. 
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misrepresentations, and false pleasures undermine the idea that pleasure is 
always, indisputably and unconditionally good. That pleasure is 
unconditionally good goes hand in hand with the view that it is essentially 
a feeling or sensation because with a feeling or sensation, there are no 
objects, no concerns, or beliefs to be wrong about. The same is not true of 
beliefs and representations and expectations where we do attach 
significance in ways in which can be judged good and bad, correct and 
mistaken. Regarding our own interests and in relation to a good life as a 
whole, an individual’s goodness is constituted by the sorts of attitudes and 
perspectives that they take on, and mistakes can be made at this level that 
can ruin lives (Russell, 2005:8, 167). So, the value of true pleasures goes 
beyond merely that the events or occasion that you were pleased at was a 
real event, as opposed to one induced or manufactured by a machine, to the 
value of having the right sorts of belief, values and attitudes such that you 
experience pleasure as a result of truly flourishing. 
In short, Plato argues that you cannot understand the nature of pleasure 
(and pain) without reference to their meaning, and what pleasures and pains 
are about is open to discrimination, in ways which impact upon their value 
and place in the good-life.8 Consequently, the goodness of pleasure, is 
conditional on other goods like virtue and truth. This creates a problem for 
the HC in that someone wishing to live a good life will need to select the 
good pleasures from an array of pleasures that includes “counterfeit” and 
bad (vicious) pleasures, so that simply producing as much pleasure units as 
possible, will fail to secure the good-life (Gosling & Taylor, 1982:135). 
Furthermore, any attempt by the hedonist to be discerning in the selection 
of pleasures would seem to involve deference to other values, thereby 
dethroning pleasure. 
With regard to the second counter argument about other goods equally 
valuable, if not more to the good life, Hurka’s analysis continues on to 
address what he says Plato and Aristotle posit as the ultimate good: the good 
variously called, reason, knowledge and wisdom (Hurka, 2011:5–6). Hurka 
draws attention to the value of knowledge via Robert Nozick’s Experience 
Machine thought experiment which purports to show that we value 
knowledge of the world and of our place in it and real relationships to other 
people, not just pleasant illusions of these things (Nozick, 1974:42–45; 
1989:104–108). If that is the case, then pleasure must have a share in the good   
                                                          
8 The roots of this argument go back to the Gorgias 499b ff. 
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life, but it is not sufficient, as the goodness of pleasure would be conditional 
in that it must respect the bounds set by the good of knowledge. 
As he did with pleasure, Hurka explores whether all knowledge is 
equally worth having, or whether some types of knowledge are more 
valuable than others. He argues that knowing a law of nature is significantly 
good (apart from any further benefits it brings) as is understanding a close 
friend’s character, and having some degree of self-knowledge can also be 
beneficial (Hurka, 2011:76–77).9 But knowing the number of blades of grass 
on a lawn, in contrast, isn’t of much value. He concludes that some 
knowledge is trivial, and not worth much and hence some kinds of 
knowledge are better than others and there must, therefore, be features that 
make them so (Hurka, 2011:77).10 Hurka’s differentiation subdivides 
knowledge into three types: knowledge of the world outside you 
(knowledge of general laws of nature and also particular facts), knowledge 
of your relation to the world (knowing where you are in space and how you 
relate to other people) and knowledge of your own internal states (your 
particular thoughts, feelings and lasting traits of character). He argues that 
philosophers rightly favour the first kinds of knowledge: general 
explanatory truths, scientific truths, and truths of metaphysics, of 
philosophical understanding, truths that are general by being widely 
extended, and having explanatory importance (Hurka, 2011:77–79).11 
Hurka agrees that this latter kind of knowledge is good, but he argues 
that its absence isn’t what troubles us most when we think about our 
situation on the Experience Machine (Hurka, 2011:86–90). What he thinks is 
troubling is the delusion of your relation to the world and people in it (the 
second type of knowledge) because he argues holding positively false beliefs 
is worse than lacking knowledge. Why it is worse is illustrated by another 
thought experiment that asks us to imagine a situation where an individual 
believes that they are a hero, and take pleasure in their loving and faithful 
partner, adoring children, and colleagues’ respect, but who is completely  
                                                          
9 Hurka argues that some kinds of self-knowledge harmful, and some kinds of delusions useful 
(Hurka, 2011:91). 
10 We will find Plato making this same concession and asking the same question (Phil 13e–14a). 
11 An item of knowledge has explanatory importance if you use it to explain a great many 
other things you know. For example, if you know the law of gravity you can use it 
to explain more specific laws (Hurka, 2011:78–86). 
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mistaken in all those beliefs.12 If pleasure alone were the only good, and they 
never discovered the truth, under hedonism their condition remains ideal 
since they have all the pleasant feelings that make up their happiness. If this 
doesn’t seem right then it looks as though we want our pleasures/beliefs to 
match reality, not just be delusions/fantasies.13 
And so Hurka concludes that being positively mistaken about where you 
are, and your relationships to other people, is a significant evil even if 
knowing these things isn’t an equally as important good (Hurka, 2011:89). 
If, in the above example, our hero had been right about the love and esteem 
he was held in, but misled on the fundamental nature of the universe, this 
doesn’t seem so troubling. And so, it follows that in the senses given, 
knowledge is a good, but not the good, and some kinds of knowledge are 
more valuable than others. Just like pleasure, even the good of knowledge 
appears conditional. The type of knowledge Plato and Aristotle are said to 
hold as necessary and sufficient is not, it seems, the most important.  
In the following chapters, as Hurka moves through a list of goods, each 
is found to be conditional. For example, achievement is also something 
missing on the Experience Machine, or in the lives of the lotus eaters. And 
much like items of knowledge, not all achievements have equal value. 
Figuring out how to split the atom and eradicating a disease are major 
achievements, planting a garden less so. As with knowledge, if this is the 
case then there must be features that explain this difference and make some 
goals more worth achieving than others. Of most importance is that the 
achievements are real as opposed to manufactured illusions of achievement. 
Then achievements are improved by being general, in the senses discussed 
with regard to knowledge, how far the goal extends, how much of the world 
it includes (Hurka, 2011:99). For example, if you eradicate polio, you 
intentionally change the condition of many people, more than if you create 
a nice flower garden in your front yard.  
So Hurka rates some achievements as more valuable than others. And 
notwithstanding that he thinks there is value in games and sporting 
performances, what distinguishes the worthy ones from the trivial ones does 
match, to some degree, what distinguishes the value of the different types of  
                                                          
12 Nagel is credited with this thought experiment (Nagel, 1979:1–11). 
13 Fred Feldman offers some interesting defences against this line of argument (Feldman, 
2004:109–114). 
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knowledge. There is value in achievements that are extended in time, and 
over more of the world which includes lives that include long term goals, 
and in which the parts of a life fit in with the overall plan. These, Hurka 
argues, add value because “We can see this as involving a kind of 
cooperation between your selves at different times, as they work together to 
achieve a long-term goal involving them all. And their doing so adds worth 
to what each does” (Hurka, 2011:101). So, Hurka sees value in having a plan 
that not only extends your interests through time but also unifies them, into 
a coherent whole (Hurka, 2011:104–105). Of course, this requires, reason, 
knowledge and discipline, and can, Hurka observes, lead to a loss of other 
goods, but on balance he thinks some intelligent and context dependent 
structure in a life can be prudent and beneficial, making it more choice 
worthy (Hurka, 2011:111, 166, 186). 
And Hurka goes on to argue that if we reject hedonism’s valuing of 
vicious pleasures such as sadistic pleasures in another’s pain, and its 
rejection of compassionate pains, we should add moral virtue to our list of 
goods, adding further conditions to the goodness of pleasure, and the 
badness of pain (Hurka, 2011:119). Virtue involves an attitude, where the 
attitude’s object is something with a positive moral quality (and mutatis 
mutandis for vice). As such, Hurka concludes it involves a certain relation to 
other intrinsic goods and evils, and thus can’t be the only intrinsic good, as 
he suggests Plato was arguing in the Republic (Hurka, 2011:134–135). 
However, it is a good on the list, and like the other goods it provides a 
boundary, as it were to other goods, making them conditional, so that we 
can say that it is bad to take pleasure in torturing, and it’s good to take 
pleasure in helping, and it’s bad to learn about human psychology in order 
to manipulate people to malevolent ends, and it’s good to come to 
understand the nature of solar radiation for the purposes of building solar 
panels, for example.  
The failure of both pleasure and knowledge, as well as the other 
purported goods, on their own to be the necessary and sufficient ingredient 
in the good life gives grounds to argue (as the list theorists do) that there is 
not one single ultimate good or one universal good life that fits all humans, 
and that the good life will thus include a list of intrinsic goods, pleasure, 
knowledge, virtue, and achievement among them. At this point, questions 
might turn to what goods make the list, and how they rank against one 
another, for as Plato has Protarchus argue in the Philebus, other goods might 
be necessary but one still chiefly responsible for its goodness.  
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Hurka in his concluding chapter says that how good a life is, depends on 
the individual good things it contains, its pleasures, items of understanding, 
achievements, its ethics etc., but also on other factors (Hurka, 2001:163–164). 
One of the other factors is how the different goods compare in value to each 
other, whether pleasure more important to the individual than knowledge, 
for example. Throughout his book he gives many good arguments, which I 
cannot address, in which he carefully shows that there won’t be a single 
good that makes for a good life, or a good life that suits everyone. Instead 
the good life involves possessing something between a list of goods and a 
recipe of them, contingent upon an individual’s own idiosyncratic 
temperaments and desires, talents and situations, social context, stage of life, 
etc. (Hurka, 2011:111,163–187). So, I take it that Hurka would not rule out 
the lives of the lotus eaters on the grounds that they aren’t concerned enough 
with knowledge, or because they devote their lives to one thing instead of 
broader, more planned and wholistic, aspirations, but thinks that lives less 
pleasant than those of the lotus eaters, but containing other goods, including 
valuable items of knowledge, and worthwhile achievements, some of which 
are wrought by structure, direction and planning could be better.14  
Plato does insist throughout his work that one good is unconditionally 
good and is both necessary and sufficient for the Good-life. But his argument 
is not widely understood. Plato (and Aristotle) we are told, put reason (used 
interchangeably with knowledge and wisdom) as the necessary and 
sufficient ingredient for the good life (Hurka, 2011:5–6). And the type of 
knowledge they are said to be advocating is that described above as being 
concerned with general, widely extended, and eternal truths. And while it is 
true that reason and all its relations, wisdom, knowledge and 
understanding, are put forth as the necessary and sufficient condition for 
happiness, Plato complicates things by equating being rational with being 
virtuous, which amounts to what can be called “intelligent agency” (Russell, 
2005:138–205). It is this move by Plato that is not correctly understood or  
                                                          
14 Hurka is more open to the possibility of unstructured goods than Plato. He doesn’t think it’s 
clear for example, that it’s better that one’s achievements are spread across a diverse range, 
or deeply focused in one area, and he thinks that the possibility of early death, makes some 
longer term goods vulnerable, while giving some value to those of the moment (Hurka, 
2011:111, 163–187). 
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presented in Hurka’s admittedly brief characterisations of his position, in 
The Best Things in Life, or in the wider literature. 
Plato is not arguing that a life of pure intellectual contemplation of the 
Forms and philosophical understanding of eternal truths is the best life. A 
human life will require a range of goods, necessary for embodied psyches, 
living in communities, and all the pleasures and pains that come with them 
in order to flourish.15 But because of this, not in spite of it, he argues that 
there is one ingredient in the good life that is the most critical to a life well 
lived. That ingredient ultimately ends up being the intelligent agency which 
gives the direction and structure necessary for a good life (Phil 22b–31b). Of 
course, Plato based these arguments in his metaphysics of being and in many 
different dialogues in which we often see the equation of virtue with 
following the direction of reason. But it is with this foundation that Plato 
posited what Daniel Russell calls a directive conception of happiness, and 
thereby distinguishes his position in important ways from both hedonism, 
and from positions which by contrast can be seen as additive in that they are 
an unstructured list of goods (Russell, 2005:9, 17). 
From Plato’s perspective, the hedonists go wrong in making happiness 
depend upon a very conditional good. And Hurka’s argument for 
happiness, he would argue, doesn’t properly recognise that reason and all 
its relations, including virtue, which take a wholistic approach to happiness, 
is the unconditional good in that it provides the direction that makes a mere 
list of ingredients (conditional goods), a recipe for a good life (Russell, 
2005:9–10). So, while it is true to say that Plato is of the view that there is one 
necessary and sufficient good, with regard to the good life, (and it is 
variously called reason, knowledge, wisdom and virtue) the argument is not 
like that of the Hedonists, with regard to there being one good, and instead 
Plato manages to integrate a range of goods under the unconditional good 
of the direction of reason. 
The foundation of Plato’s argument, as previously stated, is his wider 
arguments about the Good and his metaphysical framework. Many a reader 
of the Philebus (its announced topic is the nature of pleasure) has been 
dismayed to find there is a metaphysical preface to the discussion of 
pleasure in the Philebus which does not seem immediately relevant. To this  
                                                          
15 This is the point behind Socrates’ distinguishing between the life of humans, and the life of 
gods (Phil 33b). 
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point in the dialogue, Socrates had only got Protarchus to agree that reason 
is necessary, but nonetheless, Protarchus still insisted that it was pleasure 
that was making the good life, good. In short, Protarchus’ view is that reason 
is necessary for happiness, only because pleasure is necessary for happiness 
(Phil 21c–d). To disabuse Protarchus of this view Plato then has Socrates 
investigate the nature of αἰτία (responsibility or cause), and how reason and 
pleasure each stand in relation to it. And he gives some metaphysics on the 
fundamental question of what it is for something to be part of, and play a 
role within, a structured constitution.  
The central idea of Plato’s fourfold division of all things (Phil 23b–31b) is 
that to have οὐσία (being) is to be a structured whole, which comes about 
when πέρας (limit) is placed upon the ἂπειρον (unlimited). The bringing of 
a limit upon the class of the unlimited produces a μικτά (mixture), and in 
every case of a being, this mixture is formed from parts that play different 
roles in accounting for its being what it is. In particular, one of the 
ingredients of the mixture is the cause of the mixture itself and thus is the 
most important. This metaphysical digression is then bought to bear on the 
question of the good life. Plato has Socrates say that the best (human) life is 
such a mixture, with pleasure in the class of the unlimited, and reason 
playing the role of giving structure and limit to the unlimited. Thus, they 
each play very different roles. Reason is the cause of the mixture, and it is 
the intelligent agency that makes a thing (a life) what it is, by bringing, 
ἀναλογία, proportion, direction, and limit, to its parts like pleasure which 
do not in themselves have any determinate direction or proportion in 
relation to one’s life as a whole.16 
This metaphysical digression supports the role reason plays in direction, 
structure and being, which is one of Plato’s central concerns and fits with a 
discussion on conditional and unconditional goods that Plato had given in 
an earlier dialogue the Euthydemus. There, it is argued that virtue is the 
unconditional good that is primary for the goodness of the good life in that 
it involves following the direction of reason, which by its nature gives 
structure and hence being and goodness to a whole thing. It means that 
pleasure, and the other goods like health, wealth, and even knowledge and 
so on only become good when under the direction of reason.  
Recall that both Plato and Hurka, (though to different degrees, as Hurka 
leaves more room for less structured goods) thought that goods like 
pleasure, were improved by being integrated with our values and beliefs   
                                                          
16 Analysis of Plato’s Fourfold Division can be found in Hampton, 1990 and Usher, 2012. 
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and goals that form a whole human life. And hence the HC fails because we 
do not simply want to have the most and greatest pleasures that we can, but 
to have the right ones, about the right things. Because pleasure is a kind of 
attitude built upon our underlying values, priorities, and conceptions of 
ourselves, we can ask of a pleasure whether it is playing the right kind of 
role in our life, is it in the right (true and virtuous) things so that it fits in 
with other values we hold, goals we may have, and the overall structure of 
our life. We might say then, that for both Plato and to some extent Hurka, 
pleasure is good under certain conditions, conditions determined by the 
shape of a whole good life. And as we saw, similar questions can be asked 
of the different kinds of knowledge. 
Russell’s work on Plato draws attention to the Euthydemus where Plato 
has a discussion in which virtue emerges as the unconditional good (Russell, 
2005:9, 16–48). Virtue is singled out because all the other goods (health, 
wealth, pleasure, knowledge etc.) are seen as conditional, in that their 
goodness depends on their being given good direction, something they 
cannot do themselves, while virtue alone, (conceived of as following the 
direction of reason, or intelligent agency), is declared an unconditional good, 
because it is the source of direction that brings about goodness in other 
things, (Euth 278e–282d). The parallels with the discussion in the Philebus on 
the “Four-fold division of all things” in which the cause (reason) was an 
ingredient with a radically different and important role to all the other 
ingredients or parts of the whole are clear. 
So, the answer given by Hurka and others to the question of what makes 
life good, is that happiness is determined by the various good things in one’s 
life, health, wealth, pleasure, status etc., in some list or recipe or of such 
things. He seems, for the most part, to think that it is a recipe which is to say 
that the goods in the good life must be in some kind of proportion or 
structure with reference to other goods and a life as a whole, as opposed to 
a list of goods included in an unstructured or barely structured way, but 
isn’t as structured as Plato would insist, because he allows for goods that fall 
outside of ambitions and regard for the truth, and thinks that there isn’t a 
best choice in some situations.17 Plato’s position is, in contrast,   
                                                          
17 As an example of there being no clear best option, Hurka points to two different artists, one 
B.B. King, who stuck with and deeply refined one artistic style, the other Picasso, who is 
constantly experimenting and innovating, and argues that there isn’t a reason to prefer 
either the focused achievements or the move diverse (Hurka, 2011:111). He pursues this 
theme in Chapter 8, where he considers whether a highly focused and planned life is always 
better than one that has some degree of flexibility and spontaneity (Hurka, 2011:163–187). 
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uncompromising in that the good life depends on, and is determined by, the 
direction that all areas of life take together as a whole, such that it is its nature 
as a recipe as opposed to a mere list of ingredients that makes it the good 
life. And this demand for a holistic conception of happiness, and the role 
reason must play in it underlies Plato’s directive conception and is his 
central contribution to this debate. 
I would argue that some of Plato’s arguments for his position can also be 
found in Hurka’s arguments. The goods which Hurka includes on his list, 
are for the most part, conditional goods or goods improved by fitting in with 
the overarching, more expansive goal of living a good life as a whole. 
Broadly speaking Hurka does argue that reflecting on life as a whole gives 
the good life a structure which has a place for the pleasures of the lotus 
eaters, but much more space for those that are part of a life lived with regard 
to a whole life and the other values of knowledge, achievement, and virtue.18 
Although Hurka thinks that there are some less or unstructured goods, he 
still seemed to think that pleasures and the other goods like knowledge and 
virtue were improved when they were taken in accordance with virtuous, 
more expansive, and longer term, goals and holistic concerns. So, there is 
much in common in their arguments.  
There’s always a condition that makes for good pleasures, good 
knowledge, good achievements in Hurka, despite his scepticism around 
better and worse pleasures. As he himself suggests at times, it’s when they 
fit in with larger wholistic concerns, and respect the value of other goods 
like truth and virtue etc., that they are good. Plato’s conception of pleasures 
and pains as essentially representational/propositional attitudes allows him 
to imbue them with values beyond their pleasantness, in a way that Hurka 
cannot or does not. Plato can do this in a unified way with the other virtues 
with reference to the same sort of concerns that led Hurka to argue for a list 
of goods. The goodness of the attitudes and perspectives we adopt that 
constitute our pleasures (and pains) can be judged, true or false, good and 
bad, better and worse. 
Granted, there is much more to be said and argued about Plato’s claims 
here and their metaphysical foundations. Plato sometimes talks as if the 
integrating function of rationality is all there is to the good life, rather than 
being a feature of the structure of the goods in the good life. And I have had 
to gloss over amount of work his concept of virtue does in his argument. 
Plato’s view of the role of pleasure in the good life rests upon his account of  
                                                          
18 (Phil 21b–d). 
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pleasure as a kind of attitude that can be transformed under the leadership 
of intelligent agency, suggesting a cooperative relationship between reason 
and desire (Russell, 2005:12–13). This commits him to what we could call the 
agreement model of psychic conformity and yet, Plato in other dialogues, 
presents a control model.19 By way of illustration using the example of the 
lotus eaters, Plato’s argument seems to be that Odysseus (reason) could have 
explained the nature of the cosmos to his crew (our affective natures) and 
brought about an awareness in them that they actually wouldn’t enjoy the 
life of a lotus eater as much as living in accordance with the grand design of 
things, and that they would come to believe it and happily leave the island. 
On the other hand, in other dialogues, reason is presented as having to, like 
Odysseus, force the crew into submission. Plato does not seem to have 
chosen one over the other as an account of psychic conformity, hence his 
claim that our affective nature is willing and able to grasp and adopt the 
direction that our rational nature gives it, lacks support and leaves some 
very important issues in his argument unresolved (Russell, 2005:205–239). 
Nonetheless, to recognise the central role reason will play in giving 
direction and therefore structure to all the dimensions of a human life, is 
Plato’s contribution to this debate. As Hurka often suggested, thinking 
about what you want from life at the various different stages of life and how 
to put together the different dimensions of that life in the most prudent way 
is likely to be beneficial. For continuing beings with complex social and 
biological needs and desires (including desires for their existence to be 
meaningful) having the right kinds of attitudes, a plan, and priorities would 
be assets and more effective, one would imagine, than putting together a 
future as a being that feels as much of a certain sensation as possible, or 
which had a list of goods, but in an unstructured and undirected way. 
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